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Abstract— Organisational information security policy 
contents are disseminated by awareness and training drives. 
Its success is usually judged based on immediate post-
training self-reports which are usually subject to social 
desirability bias. Such self-reports are generally positive, but 
they cannot act as a proxy for actual subsequent behaviours. 
This study aims to formulate and test a more comprehensive 
way of measuring the efficacy of these awareness and training 
drives, called ASTUTE. We commenced by delivering security 
training. We then assessed security awareness (post-training), 
and followed up by measuring actual behaviours. When we 
measured actual behaviours after a single delivery of security 
awareness training, the conversion from intention to behaviour 
was half of the desired 100%. We then proceeded to deliver the 
training again, another two times.  
The repeated training significantly reduced the gap between 
self-reported intention and actual secure behaviours. 
Keywords: information security awareness, information 
security assessment, intention behaviour gap 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most of the primary information security focus has been on 
deploying technical countermeasures to repel attackers [1]. 
Yet there is an increasing awareness of the reality that, despite 
all these measures, an organisation’s success or failure 
ultimately depends on the actions of its employees [2], [3]. 
Insiders, unlike malicious outsiders, have legitimate and 
widespread access, and can thus wreak havoc simply by 
making a mistake or unthinkingly carrying out an insecure 
action.  
Regular interventions are carried out to urge maximum 
employee awareness of secure practice [4]–[6]. It is hoped 
that these awareness drives will encourage the emergence of 
a security-aware culture so that good practice will 
subsequently become the norm. The effectiveness of security 
awareness drives is, unfortunately, hard to gauge. Most 
organisations administer post-training tests to provide a 
measure of the success of the training. Such tests actually only 
gauge: (1) initial receptiveness, (2) short-term retention of 
security knowledge, and (3) an employee’s self-reported 
intention to behave securely in the future. If these measures 
are positive, the organisation subsequently labours under a 
false sense of reassurance that employees, being aware of 
good practice, will behave securely. 
However it has been shown that, regardless of their assessed 
knowledge and stated intentions, some employees will not 
fully comply with their organisation’s security policies [7], 
[8].  
It would be helpful if an organisation had a way to come up 
with a single quantification for their security awareness 
drives. This quantification measure should encapsulate 
measures of intention, knowledge and awareness. However, 
the logistics of these delivery programmes is also important 
[2], [9]. How many people received the training, for example, 
and how frequently they received training plays a role [10]. 
There is also a need to determine whether people convert their 
intentions to actual behaviours [11], which is by no means a 
given. 
Gauging the effectiveness of training is undeniably 
challenging, which is why most use post-intervention 
questionnaires as a proxy. A decade ago, there was no agreed 
mechanism for gauging the effectiveness of awareness drives 
[12], [13], but over the last few years a number of 
measurements have emerged that can be used as indicators of 
effectiveness. For instance, a scale for measuring behavioural 
intention has been proposed [14], a questionnaire measures 
security knowledge [15], and one measures security 
awareness [16]. Each of these measures one specific aspect of 
awareness and training effectiveness in a rigorous way. 
The challenge of InfoSec's Behavioural Assessment and 
Awareness Criteria is not only recognized by academia, but 
also by industry. To balance and enrich this discussion, a 
number of industry-specific white papers were included in our 
review. 
Many organisations deliver training once, and then check the 
box, considering that the necessary information has been 
imparted. Very few employees, according to a recent survey, 
receive regular or repeated security awareness training [16]. 
The main objective of the research presented in this paper is 
therefore to propose a mechanism for quantifying the 
effectiveness of safety awareness training programmes. This 
will include a component that measures attitude, knowledge 
and intention, but also a component to reflect actual 
behaviours as well as a component that is related to actual 
delivery of security awareness training [17]. We developed an 
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assessment mechanism that can be used to assess the efficacy 
of security awareness drives. We call the mechanism 
ASTuTE (Assess SecuriTy Training Effectiveness) and it is 
based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour and the 
Knowledge, Attitude and Behaviour Theory. This, we believe, 
will help organisations to establish more effective security 
awareness drives. 
II. RELATED RESEARCH AND TRENDS  
The majority of those who deliver InfoSec training assess the 
quality of the training by using a post-assessment quiz. This 
arguably measures how well the knowledge was 
communicated and understood. It is also common for people 
to be asked about their intention to behave securely straight 
after the training session. This approach hopes that 
behavioural intentions are a reliable proxy for actual 
behaviours, and assumes that knowledge is all that is required.  
Failure to measure the effectiveness of training may expose 
organisations to the following preventable errors: 
1) Pursue an ineffective awareness / training programme 
without any real improvement in behaviour. 
2) Interrupt an effective awareness / training intervention 
based on an erroneous subjective assessment, mainly because 
of a wrong perception that it is not changing behaviour or as 
being too costly in terms of employee time. 
3) It may also be that the organisation believes that everyone 
is behaving securely anyway, so that no further training is 
needed.  
InfoSec has a limited budget, therefore, there is always the 
need to justify spending for implementing of controls [18]. 
Hence, for InfoSec resources to be retained or increased, their 
expected benefits should be quantifiable. 
However, a number of recent studies conclude that intentions 
are not infallible predictors of behaviours.  In terms of secure 
behaviour assessment, only actual behaviours after awareness 
and training can reliably be measured, otherwise we are not 
measuring the actual impact of security awareness training, 
only stated intentions and short-term retention of facts. 
The research literature in various fields confirms the gap 
between awareness / knowledge and behaviour. For example, 
hand washing [19]–[21], ethics [22], smoking [23], [24], and 
environmentally-friendly behaviour [18], [25]. It is therefore 
questionable whether any intervention aimed only at 
imparting knowledge, improving attitude and engendering 
good intentions will be as efficacious as anticipated. 
A standard way of carrying out security awareness drive 
efficacy assessment has not yet emerged. What to measure 
and how to measure are two distinctive challenges for 
developing a measurement tool [12]. In an attempt to counter 
these problems Kruger and Kearny [12] identified three 
dimensions, knowledge (what an employee knows), attitude 
(what an employee thinks) and behaviour (what an employee 
does). On the other hand, Safa et al. [26] suggests dimensions 
such as involvement, attachment, commitment and the 
personal norms, while Posey et al. [27] argue that fear of 
sanctions, incentives, motivation and pride should be 
measured. 
Davis [28] likewise, believes that assessment of InfoSec 
behaviour is intricate, However endeavors to assess it by 
measuring knowledge and behavioural intent. However, 
InfoSec audit results, lost productivity, user satisfaction and 
knowledge  are suggested by Chapple [29]. The European 
Network and Information Security Agency [30] recommends 
the measuring of process improvement, attack resistance, 
efficiency/effectiveness and internal protections. Literature 
exposes the lack of agreement regarding what to measure and 
how its measured. 
III. THEORETICAL BACKROUND 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) postulates that 
behavioural intentions  are the motivator employee behaviour 
[31]–[36]. Behavioural intentions are a function of the 
employee's behavioural attitude, subjective standards of 
behavioural performance, and the employee's perception of 
the ease with which the behaviour can be performed 
(behavioural control) [31]. TPB suggests that stronger 
behavioural intentions are more likely to convert to actual 
behaviour. 
Kruger and Kearney [12] proposed the theory of Knowledge 
Attitude & Behaviour (KAB). Its main purpose being the 
facilitation of factors that lead to secure behaviour. KAB is 
regarded as an influential explanatory theory for predicting 
employee intention to behave in a secure manner [16], [37]. 
Awareness and training at InfoSec provide employees with 
knowledge and help to generate attitudes that, in combination, 
help employees formulate their behavioural intentions. [12]. 
However, what is missing in these two theories is a practical 
relationship between actual behaviour and behavioural 
intentions.   
ASTUTE extends Kruger and Kearney’s [12] “Knowledge, 
Attitude & Behaviour” model to measure post-training 
awareness. We then add two additional components: (1) 
Training Delivery Logistics, and (2) Actual Secure Behaviour 
Assessment. 
IV. THE ASTUTE METHOD 
At the time of writing, the assessment of effectiveness and 
impact of training on InfoSec has no commonly accepted 
standard [12]. Being used currently are a number of different 
qualitative and quantitative awareness measures. This 
research therefore attempts design, conceptualize and 
validates a novel mechanism for InfoSec training assessment, 
as shown in Figure 1. 
The measurements of the ASTUTE components deliver a 
holistic insight into the effectiveness of security awareness 
and training programmes: 
Construct one (C1) is concerned with the delivery aspects of 
InfoSec assessment. These aspects include number of 
employees trained, how often the employees are trained and 
the scores of the employees (pass rates). 
Construct two (C2) addresses awareness assessment as 
 
 
suggested by the Kruger and Kearney’s [12] knowledge, 
behaviour and attitude constructs. 
Construct three (C3) covers the behavioural assessments. 
These are focused on aspects like statistics from antivirus 
software, recorded incident logs and observations that are 
made. 
 
Figure 1: ASTUTE Training Assessment mechanism 
1) Delivery Assessment: It is beneficial for an organisation 
to include operational measures to their InfoSec assessment. 
E-learning is one of the most efficient tools for delivery 
reporting. Most organisations are making use of e-learning 
awareness programmes. These learning management systems 
used to administer knowledge provide a variety of reports. 
These includes dimensions like number of employees trained, 
and post-training assessment scores.  
2) Awareness Assessment: Once routine awareness reports 
have been established on a regular and accurate basis, more 
in-depth assessments, such as the evaluation of intent, become 
necessary. Whether or not InfoSec is directly related to 
InfoSec's behaviours is determined by these measures. 
Meaning they determine whether training has the desired 
effect with regards to employee security behaviour and 
organisational security culture. 
When determining the intent attributes to be captured, it is 
important to consider the key determinants of security 
behaviour from the employee's point of view. It can be argued 
that the organisation's overall security position is better of 
when its InfoSec objectives and requirements and the 
attitudes, knowledge and behaviours of its employees are 
aligned [38].  
3) Behaviour Assessment: Prior to assessing intention, 
problematic behaviour (also called target behaviour) and 
desired behaviour (also called replacement behaviour) must 
be clearly defined. In other words, they must be accurately 
stated in observable and measurable terms.  
This assessment mechanism proposed by ASTUTE aims to 
guide professional judgment regarding the safe behaviour of 
employees. It can be used to evaluate awareness and 
effectiveness training initiatives by measuring results. 
V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Development of the mechanism was done through the 
application of a qualitative approach. For an understanding of 
the manifestation of behaviours in the InfoSec context, 
Literature review of effective behavioural change factors was 
done within InfoSec, behavioural studies and psychology 
realm. This led to the designing and development of the initial 
mechanism. Improvements made by four cycles of research 
helped to refine and improve the mechanism. The research 
was conducted at a civil engineering firm in South Africa, 
where thirty of its employees voluntarily participated in the 
study. 
A. Data Collection 
The collection of primary data was facilitated by the use of 
web-based questionnaire / survey tests, observations, and the 
incident logbook. Actual behaviours were collected using the 
behaviour aspect of ASTUTE, behavioural intention was 
collected the awareness aspect and the operational controls 
were assessed by the delivery aspect. Secondary data was 
collected from published articles and books. 
B. Data Analysis 
The comparison between the awareness and behaviour aspect 
revealed the gap from intents to actual behaviours. 
Behavioural patterns were identified using the coding and 
categorization processes described by Littman [39]. In this 
study, the data collected was weighted similarly to Kruger and 
Kearney’s [12] method. The importance scaling was however 
influenced by literature, and management of organisation. 
The weighting was as follows: Delivery 15%, Awareness 
35% and Actual Behaviour 50%. 
The data analysis was performed after each iteration and 
compared with the results of the subsequent iteration to 
evaluate changes in the InfoSec behaviours of the employees. 
The total duration of the research was 11 months and 
consisted of three cycles with about 3.5 months between 
them. The three iterations had similar activities: 
1. Delivering security awareness and training 
2. Measuring awareness 
VI. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of the online questionnaire provided context as 
well as an overview of the organisation’s employees InfoSec 
knowledge levels. Observations of the employees assisted 
with first hand experience of how they behave in real life 
situations. Lastly, document surveys (incident log book and 
Antivirus/firewall report) highlighted the rate of occurrence 
of security breaches during the reporting period. 
Awareness Assessment: The survey questions collected 
information based on the intention attributes. Knowledge, 
attitude and behavioural intention was assessed by these 
questions. 
Behaviour Assessment: this assessment was conducted with 
the aid of statistics from the antivirus, firewall, incident 
reports and general observations. Employee security 
behaviours or intentions to comply, as well as their training 
 
 
needs were highlighted by these assessments. 
During the first iteration, an inadequate understanding of 
identity theft, importance of firewall, malware, encryption 
and phishing was revealed These inadequacies became topics 
for subsequent awareness / training session. These results 
helped to motivate for resource allocation for subsequent 
InfoSec awareness and training. 
The processing of the findings and importance weightings 
was done in a spreadsheet application. Presentation of the 
output was in tabular form, graphical and as awareness maps, 
as Kruger and Kearney [12] did in their study. The data 
presented reflected evidence from the intervention to support 
the propositions relating to security behaviours. The findings 
of the empirical study are summarized in Table 1 
Table 1: Summary of findings 
# Delivery Awareness Behaviour % 
1 N/A 18 N/A 18/35 (51%) 
2 N/A 28 N/A 28/35 (80%) 
3 13 32 32 (13+32+32)/100 
(77%) 
4 13 33 44 (13+33+44)/100 
90% 
 
Iteration 1 comprised two activities. Implementation of 
awareness campaigns and training was the first activity. This 
is regarded as important because despite having InfoSec 
policies in place, employees might not comply to them 
because of lack of awareness of their existence or 
understanding of their contents [40]. Literature generally 
agrees that awareness and training increases employee 
knowledge. The InfoSec position of management (subjective 
norms) are conveyed to the employees through this channel, 
this is in line with our baseline theories. Theories also 
associate knowledge with alterations of beliefs and attitudes. 
After the campaign, it was necessary to re-evaluate the 
effectiveness of the training in order to compare the results 
with the initial assessment. The evaluation during this 
iteration was carried out using Kruger’s [12] assessment tool, 
which measures employees’ attitudes, knowledge and 
behavioural intent towards information security, as well as 
their perceptions of and concerns about the approaches to 
safeguarding the information asset in the workplace. This tool 
does not assess actual security behaviour and delivery aspects. 
This is why it is not applicable (N/A) in Table 1. However, it 
follows that the behavioural intentions will be equal to the 
actual behaviours. As shown in Table 1, the average 
behavioural intention score of the employees was 51% (score 
of 18 out of 35 questions correct). This revealed a lack of 
awareness and knowledge. 
Iteration 2 was carried out because the security behaviour 
levels after iteration 1 had increased but not to the levels 
deemed to be acceptable by the researchers and the 
organisation’s management. Table 1 shows a 51% to 80% 
(average of 30 out of 35 questions correct) increase that after 
the first awareness and training initiative. This gave a 
reflection of positive change in knowledge and intention 
which was however, in contrary to the actual behavioural 
change. This highlights the flaws in the belief that behavioural 
intentions reliably lead to actual behaviours. 
Iteration 3 was similar to iteration 1 and 2. However, the 
difference from the prior assessments was that it was carried 
out using ASTUTE. This made it possible to compare results 
actual behaviour vs behavioural intentions. During this 
iteration, behavioural intentions scored 91% and this gave a 
comforting sense of security. However, the actual behaviour 
measurement was 55%. This iteration gave a more accurate 
sense of effectiveness. During this iteration, the proposed 
assessment tool was used. The behavioural intent measure 
changed from 80% in the second iteration to 91% (average of 
33 out of 35 questions correct) in the third. This assessment 
was not only based on intention, but also on awareness and 
behavioural measures. These additional measures reduced the 
overall security assessment picture to 77%, after 80% in the 
previous iteration. 
Iteration 4 comprised two activities. This iteration was 
necessitated by the emergence of a gap between intention and 
actual behaviour during Iteration 3. The purpose was to 
attempt to reduce the gap by training repetition, to ensure that 
intention and awareness was converted to actual behaviour. 
Repetition, is known to influence conversion of intentions to 
actual behaviour. Which then leads to formation of habits. 
Habits are ultimately incorporated into employee culture.  
Behaviours that are not habitual require cognisant thinking to 
carry them out, thus less likely to be carried out due to the 
substantial effort required. 
In the fourth iteration, ASTUTE was used again. The delivery 
measurement did not change from the previous iteration, as 
there was no change in the number of trained staff nor in the 
training frequency. Thus, the success rate remained stable. 
During this iteration, the behaviour improved from 77% to 
90%.  
VII. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The data was collected from one South African organisation. 
A larger sample size could improve the generalizations of the 
findings. Numerous data collection approaches were used 
which might have overlapped and lead to repetition. For 
instance, an observed situation might also be found in the 
incidence log. This limitation could be reduced by checking 
dates to eliminate double recording. ASTUTE is the final 
word on security awareness efficacy assessment. It is a first 
version and clearly needs to be extended and refined as 
experience in using the mechanism is gained.  
Organisations adopting ASTUTE can add any combination of 
extra measures to the model. Blending different metrics in this 
way will help to build up a more comprehensive scorecard for 
effectiveness assessment. Decisions can be made basing on 
complete overall picture, as opposed to single measures. It is 
important not to draw incorrect conclusions from 
assessments. For example, an increase in virus infection rates 
may be an indicator of staff awareness issues, however, this 
could also be attributed to issues of with the installed antivirus 
 
 
software. Likewise, an increase in InfoSec incidents could be 
indicating issues with awareness of the employees (genuine 
increase in actual breaches), however, it could also be as a 
result of improved awareness (employees now understanding 
the importance of reporting breaches) or even a newly 
revealed (as yet unpatched) vulnerability. Using a portfolio of 
measures thus facilitates sense-making in this complex zone. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, employees' InfoSec knowledge was very low 
initially. However, they had a positive attitude towards secure 
behaviours when handling the organisation's information 
assets, although they lacked the skills carry out the secure 
behaviours. This highlights the fact that the risk that 
employees expose the organisation to may be truly 
unintentional an a consequence of of naivety [3], [8], [41]. 
What is disappointing is that although knowledge had 
considerable positive change during the iterations, attitudinal 
change remained marginal. This is probably due to employees 
having a pre-existing attitude towards the organisation, which 
awareness and training cannot necessarily alter. 
Our empirical study confirms that behavioural intentions do 
not necessarily convert to actual behaviours. Therefore, it is 
necessary to repeat awareness training until behavioural 
measures improve. We also demonstrated, with ASTUTE, 
that it is possible to quantify the efficacy of InfoSec 
interventions and we hope that organisations will benefit from 
this proposal. 
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